Denver Law Review Forum
Volume 93

Article 7

4-6-2016

Patent Law's Domestic Sales Trap
Bernard Chao

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlrforum

Recommended Citation
Bernard Chao, Patent Law's Domestic Sales Trap, 93 Denv. L. Rev. F. (2013), available at
https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2016/4/6/patent-laws-domestic-salestrap.html?rq=patent

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Denver Law Review Forum by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information,
please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

PATENT LAW’S DOMESTIC SALES TRAP
BERNARD CHAO *
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group,
Ltd. firmly shut the door on the worldwide causation theory holding that
patentees could not recover damages based on foreign sales even if those
sales were somehow caused by infringement in the United States. But
just as it closed one troubling loophole, the Federal Circuit opened another. Based on a mishmash of factors, the decision suggested that patent
law may classify some products that have never entered this country as
still being sold in the United States. If that view prevails, many products
that are made, delivered, and ultimately used abroad will still infringe
patents under this country’s law.
This Essay argues that subjecting such sales to United States patent
law fails to respect Supreme Court precedent and is inconsistent with
principles of international comity. What’s more, the Federal Circuit’s
poorly developed rule for determining where a sale takes place creates
unnecessary uncertainty and will trap the unwary. Accordingly, the
courts should rethink how patent law locates a sale, and adopt the same
bright line rule found in other areas of the law. The location of a sale
should depend on the location of the products where legal title passes
from the seller to the buyer. Such a rule makes both practical sense and is
consistent with this country’s conservative approach to applying its laws
extraterritorially.
I. Locating Sales
Section 271(a) of the patent law defines direct infringement by stating that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States . . . infringes the patent.” 1 The statute identifies particular types
of infringing conduct and requires that these activities have a specific
connection to the United States. Nevertheless, patent holders have re-

* Bernard Chao is an Associate Professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
and Of Counsel to Chao, Hadidi, Stark & Barker LLP (CHSB). CHSB represents Marvell in matters
unrelated to the Carnegie Mellon lawsuit discussed here. The opinions expressed here are mine alone
and I have not been compensated for this work. Thanks to Timothy Holbrook and John Wilson for
their helpful suggestions and Evelyn Zhao J.D. ’17 for her research on this article.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
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peatedly tried to skirt the statute’s explicit territorial limitation, and recover damages for infringing products found abroad. 2
Just last year, the Federal Circuit rejected a new worldwide causation theory that would have allowed patent holders to recover damages
on the sale of infringing products outside the United States. 3 In Carnegie
Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., the patent holder,
Carnegie Mellon University, sought to obtain royalties on infringing
semiconductor chips that the defendant made and sold abroad because
the foreign sales were “caused” by acts of domestic infringement. 4 The
defendant, Marvell, was a Silicon Valley-based semiconductor company. 5 Like many U.S. semiconductor companies, Marvell designed its
chips inside the United States, but manufactured the chips outside this
country and delivered their chips to customers abroad. 6 However, Marvell did use the infringing technology domestically as it tried to persuade
customers to include the chips in their new products. 7 Specifically, Marvell tested the chips and performed computer simulations in the United
States. 8 These activities are standard parts of a semiconductor company’s
“sales cycles” as the company tries to persuade customers to include its
chips in the customers’ products. 9 Both activities “used” the infringing
technology and thus are a form of direct infringement under § 271(a).
Accordingly, Carnegie Mellon was able to point to acts of infringement
and argue that they “caused” customers to eventually buy Marvell’s
chips overseas. 10
In the end, the Federal Circuit rejected Carnegie Mellon’s worldwide causation theory, saying “it was not enough . . . that the damagesmeasuring foreign activity have been factually caused . . . by domestic
activity constituting infringement . . . .” 11 “[T]erritoriality is satisfied
2. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (patentee arguing to extend
defendant’s liability based on copies of defendant’s software loaded on computers abroad);
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (patent holder seeking to hold defendant liable for making and selling in the United States parts of the patented device for assembly
and use abroad), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), as recognized in Microsoft, 550 U.S.
437.
3. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. (Carnegie Mellon II), Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283,
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4. See Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77 (2014) (describing
the
theory
and
criticizing
it
on
both
policy
and
doctrinal
grounds),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=nulr_onli
ne.
5. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd. (Carnegie Mellon I), 986 F. Supp. 2d
574, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2013) aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
6. Id. at 593–94.
7. Id. at 593.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 644.
11. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. (Carnegie Mellon II), Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283,
1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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when and only when any one of those domestic actions for that unit (e.g.,
sale) is proved to be present [in the United States].” 12 But the Federal
Circuit did not apply this rule to bar Carnegie Mellon from recovering
royalties on the infringing semiconductor chips that remained outside the
United States. 13 Rather the decision suggested that these chips may
somehow have been sold in this country, and the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine if that was the case. 14
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit did not provide a specific legal
definition that the district court could easily apply. Relying on a trail of
confusing precedent, the court said that the location of a sale depends on
several different factors including where the contract was signed, the
place of delivery and “‘perhaps’ . . . where other ‘substantial activities of
the sales transaction’ occurred.” 15 Although the Federal Circuit did not
say what those other activities are, it did point out that Marvell designed,
simulated, tested, evaluated, and qualified its chips in the United States. 16
Likewise, it noted that Marvell’s customers performed many of those
same activities in this country. 17 The clear implication is that all these
activities are factors used to determine where the ultimate sale takes
place.
II. Practical Considerations
There are several practical problems with defining the location of
sale by this mishmash of factors. First, it leaves companies thinking
about offshoring various activities for no good reason. One might question whether companies would really relocate facilities and activities
because of patent law, but it would not be the first time. In 2012, Microsoft moved its European distribution center from Germany to the
Netherlands rather than risk an injunction in Germany that would affect
its ability to serve other markets. 18 The large amounts of money at issue
12. Id. at 1306.
13. Id. at 1308.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Federal Circuit conceded that by applicable standards, there is no single, universally applicable fact that determines the location of a sale, much less that a sale can have multiple
locations. Id. Additional factors the Federal Circuit has considered include “the location of the seller
and the buyer,” “the points along the shipment route,” “the place where the sales transaction would
be deemed to have occurred as a matter of commercial law,” and locations of “contracting and
performance.” See, e.g., N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (holding that the infringing sale occurred at the buyer’s location, “though not necessarily
only there”); Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Products, Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding infringing sale within the U.S. because infringing products were sold and delivered from outside
the U.S. directly to customers in the United States); MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding no sale within the U.S. because no evidence suggested “contracting and performance” within the U.S. and “all of the essential
activities took place” outside the U.S.).
16. Carnegie Mellon II, 807 F.3d at 1309.
17. Id.
18. Loek Essers, Patent Litigation Risk Drives Microsoft to Move European Distribution
Center, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 2, 2012, 10:17 AM),
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also suggest that offshoring is a real concern. 19 In previous cases that
considered subjecting international sales to U.S. patent law, the damage
base increased roughly four times when foreign sales were included. 20
A second problem with the current test is its lack of clarity. Indeed,
the court even admits that it is uncertain if there is only one place of
sale. 21 This murkiness makes it extremely difficult to give good legal
advice. Should a company’s attorney advise their client to locate their
sales staff abroad? Should U.S. companies require customers to send
purchase orders to overseas offices? Should they meet with potential
customers in safe havens like the Bahamas? Should computer simulations be performed on equipment located abroad? Can a person in the
United States initiate the simulation so long as a foreign based computer
performs the primary calculations? Alternatively, does the person “controlling” the simulation have to be outside the country too? Is one of
these activities sufficient alone, a few together, or should companies
move all these activities offshore? Or, do none of these activities matter
if the customer evaluates the technology in the United States?
Finally, a third problem with the current test is that its effects will
not be felt equally. Because the test is so unintuitive, it will create a trap
for the unwary. Unsophisticated companies are unlikely to think that
products made and delivered abroad will somehow be subject to U.S
patent law. Consequently, they will do nothing and suffer the consequences. In contrast, sophisticated companies will consider a host of ridiculous and incredibly unproductive legal strategies and avoid exposure
to U.S patent law.
III. Extraterritoriality and the Law
Defining a sale as taking place in this country when the product
never touches our borders would also violate one of the Supreme Court’s
basic principles: the presumption against the extraterritorial application
of United States law. 22 This presumption is particularly strong in patent
law, where the Supreme Court has noted that “[o]ur patent system makes

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9225745/Patent_litigation_risk_drives_Microsoft_to_move
_European_distribution_center [http://perma.cc/J6R9-RBU2].
19. In Carnegie Mellon’s lawsuit with Marvell, the royalty base for the products made and
ultimately used abroad was almost one billion dollars. Chao, supra note 4, at 89.
20. Id. (analyzing the damages at issue in both the Carnegie Mellon I and another decision
involving similar issues, Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc.,
711 F.3d 1348, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
21. Carnegie Mellon II, 807 F.3d at 1308 (“[I]t is not even settled whether a sale can have
more than one location.” (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378–79)).
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he presumption
against extraterritorial application . . . provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))).
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no claim to extraterritorial effect.” 23 The Court has even said that under
the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to enact patent laws
that extend to foreign commerce. 24
Relying on this presumption, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to extend U.S. patent law to encompass foreign activities. In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., Microsoft had been exporting Windows
operating systems to foreign computer manufacturers by email or by
sending a master disk. 25 AT&T argued that Microsoft was liable under
§ 271(f) for supplying components of a patented invention from the
United States. 26 The Supreme Court rejected AT&T’s theory and held
that Microsoft was not “supplying components” because only copies of
Microsoft’s software were being loaded into the computers. 27 One important reason underlying the Court’s decision was the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent laws. 28
Similarly in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Inc., the Supreme
Court held that a product that was assembled abroad was not made in the
United States under § 271(a) even though all its components were made
domestically. 29 Together Deepsouth and Microsoft demonstrate how seriously the Supreme Court views the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in the patent law context generally, and
§ 271 particularly. Of course, the issue here is whether the court should
interpret a sale under § 271 to be inside the United States when the products never touch U.S. soil.
The Supreme Court has even said that Congress must provide a
“clear and certain signal” before expanding patent statutes wider than
courts had previously thought. 30 But since there is no “clear and certain
23. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972); see also Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent law.”).
24. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (“The power [from Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution] thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined
within the limits of the United States. It confers no power on Congress to regulate commerce, or the
vehicles of commerce, which belong to a foreign nation, and occasionally visit our ports in their
commercial pursuits.”).
25. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
26. Id. at 442.
27. Id. at 453 (“Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components ‘from the United States . . .
in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.’ Under this formulation,
the very components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.” (citation omitted)).
28. Id. at 454 (“Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).
29. Id. at 528 –29. The Deepsouth decision provoked Congress to pass 35 U.S.C. § 271(f),
which explicitly states that the exportation of the unassembled components of a patented invention is
an infringement if the exporter actively induces the assembly of the device outside of the United
States. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2132 (2008).
30. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). Courts may have to
be more cautious in applying laws extraterritorially after Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561
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signal” from Congress endorsing a definition of the place of sale that
would encompass products that never enter this country, the Federal Circuit should reject that theory now.
Finally, as I previously argued, expanding U.S. patent law to capture foreign sales is also troubling from an international policy perspective. 31 I won’t repeat those arguments in their entirety here. But the main
point is straightforward. Under the present international patent regime,
each country issues and enforces its own patents. 32 If the United States
expects other countries to defer to U.S. law when products are made,
delivered and ultimately consumed in this country, our courts should not
try to apply United States law to products that remain abroad.
IV. A Simple Solution
The solution is simple. Patent law should adopt a bright line rule
that is both easy to apply and consistent with common sense notions of
where a sale takes place. The Federal Circuit has already said that “a
contract between two U.S. companies for the sale of the patented invention with delivery and performance in the U.S. constitutes a sale under
§ 271(a) as a matter of law.” 33 That rule should also apply to foreign
companies. But that’s as far as U.S. patent law should extend. It should
not allow some unknown sales-related activities to expand the contours
of what we consider a domestic sale. That injects undesirable uncertainty
into the law.
Relying on where delivery takes place to define the location of a
sale has the additional benefit of being consistent with other legal regimes. For example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides
that “[a] ‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price.” 34 The Uniform Commercial Code further contains a default
rule with regard to the passing of title. That is, title passes to the buyer
when the seller has completed performance with regard to the physical
delivery of the goods, and it is the “time and place” of delivery or ship-

U.S. 247, 255 (2010). See Timothy Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 C AMPBELL L.
REV. 581, 606 (2012) (arguing that Morrison bolstered the strength of the extraterritorial presumption).
31. Chao, supra note 4 at 86–87.
32. Martin J. Adelman, Shubha Ghosh, Amy Landers & Toshiko Takenaka, Global Issues in
Patent Law 1 (2011) (“A patent is a creature of national law, and an inventor seeking worldwide
protection for her creation would have to obtain a patent in every country that offers patent protection.”).
33. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Uniform Commercial Code takes a slightly different approach and
distinguishes a sale from a “contract for sale” or “agreement to sell.” Federal cases have elaborated,
finding that a “contract for sale” or “agreement to sell” is a binding commitment for the exchange of
goods for a price, but is not the “sale” itself. Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1377–
78 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Regardless of these differences, the two approaches both agree that the location
of sale is determined by where delivery takes place.
34. U.C.C. § 2-106 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2003).
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ment that controls. 35 Similarly, under international tax law, a sale occurs
“at the time when, and the place where, the rights, title, and interest of
the seller in the property are transferred to the buyer,” 36 and gains are
generally taxed based on the location where the title to the personal
property passed from seller to buyer. 37
Defining the location of sale as the place where delivery occurs also
makes intuitive sense. It limits the location to places where the goods
have been physically present; the specific location is where ownership
rights transfer. This bright line rule will avoid confusion and allow companies to conduct their business with greater confidence. It will also
eliminate the sales trap that exists under current law.
Now the sharpness of the rule may dull if courts need to respond to
schemes that try to evade the rule. Of course creating such exceptions is
perfectly acceptable so long as they stay consistent with the underlying
purposes of the rule. But, at this time, I don’t envision a need for any
exceptions because I can’t imagine how any rule-evading schemes might
work. If someone were to move the location of an infringing sale abroad
to avoid infringement, U.S. patent law would still apply so long as the
infringing products were either manufactured in the United States or ultimately used here. 38 To the extent that neither of those activities took
place in this country, the products should not be the concern of U.S. patent law.
CONCLUSION
This country’s patent laws only apply to infringing sales that take
place inside the United States. Unfortunately, the location of a sale is
poorly defined under current Federal Circuit precedent. For those that
understand the law, this creates bizarre incentives for companies to locate a hodgepodge of sales-related activities outside the United States.
Even then, no one can reliably predict the results of the court’s current
test. For those that are unaware of this legal nook, it creates a trap for the
unwary. Products that are made, delivered, and ultimately used abroad
may still infringe patents under this country’s law. The solution is to
provide a clearer, more intuitive definition. Specifically, the location of
the sale should take place where delivery takes place and title to the
products pass.

35.
36.
37.

Id. § 2-401(2).
26 C.F.R. §§ 1.861–7(c).
ALLISON CHRISTIANS, SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 28 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2011).
38. Direct infringement as defined 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) does not just cover sales, but also
making, using, offering to sell any patented inventions in the United State or importing such inventions into the United States.

